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NOTES
NEw AND CoMPREHENSIVE DuTIES oF SECURITIES SELLERS To INVESTIGATE,
DISCLOSE, AND HAVE AN "ADEQUATE BASIS" FOR REPRESENTATIONS

The duties of investigation and disclosure imposed upon securities
salesmen have been significantly enlarged by several recent cases generated
by the Second Circuit's 1963 decision of Berko v. SEC.1 In a hearing before
the Securities and Exchange Commission2 it was found that Berka was a
salesman working out of an acknowledged "boiler room." 8 His employer
had provided its salesmen, including Berka, with fraudulent sales brochures,4 some of which were subsequently distributed by Berko. The action
by the Commission against Berko arose out of the sale of a specific security
to a customer who had received fraudulent sales brochures and had called
Berko to inquire about investment in the stock. In the course of this particular sale, Berko represented that there was a "good possibility" that the
market value of the stock would, within a year, increase to fifteen from its
sale price of seven. In finding this conduct to be a violation of the antifraud provisions5 of the securities acts, the Commission had before it evidence that the salesman had himself purchased a large amount of the stock
and had sold varying amounts to his relatives as well as to others. In addition, the stock did, in fact, increase in value (albeit not within the predicted time),6 and there was uncontroverted testimony by the customer that
he had understood Berko's prediction of increase in value to be only an
opinion.1 On petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded to the Commission,8 which affirmed its previous order without further hearing, but with a revised opinion.9 In this reiterated order
316 F.2d 137 (2d ed. 1963).
Mac Robbins 8c Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6462, Feb. 6, 1961,
supplemented, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6498, March 16, 1961.
s The "boiler room" metaphor refers to the cacophony and perspiration produced
by numbers of securities salesmen simultaneously delivering high-pressure sales pitches
into rows of telephones. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 266 (1958). For discussions of boiler-room sales practices, see Report of Special Study of Securities Markets
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. I, at 265-68 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Special Study]; Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1411 (1963).
4 Berko's employer stipulated for purposes of the hearing that the brochures were
false and misleading. Mac Robbins 8c Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No, 6462,
Feb. 6, 1961.
5 Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1958); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § IO(b), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958), and § 15(c)(l), 48
Stat. 895, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(l) (1958); Rule IOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 24O.IOb-5 (1949); Rule
15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1949).
6 Mac Robbins 8c Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6462, Feb. 6, 1961.
See also Brief for Petitioner, p. 4, Berko v. SEC, 297 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1961).
7 Record, p. 139, Mac Robbins 8c Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6462,
Feb. 6, 1961.
8 Berko v. SEC, 297 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1961). "Basically • • • [the Commission's)
goal should be clarification of the legal duties imposed on salesmen involved in • • •
[boiler room] operations ••••" Id. at 119.
9 Mac Robbins 8c Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962,
affd, Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963).
1

2
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finding Berko a "cause"10 of revocation of his employer's broker-dealer
registration, the Commission emphasized that its findings were not based
on any value judgment as to the qualities of the stock involved, and that
the customer's understanding as to Berko's representations had no significance insofar as the gravamen of the salesman's offense was concemed.11
Rather, Berko's breach of duty, in the first instance, consisted of his failure
to have an "adequate basis" for his statements as to future increases in the
market value of the stock. 12 The court of appeals affirmed this holding
and, further, affirmed the Commission's additional holding that a salesman
working out of a boiler room is to be held to a higher duty of independent
investigation and disclosure than a salesman in a legitimate securities sales
operation, and that a boiler-room salesman's conduct is fraudulent if the
information he presents to the public to induce sales is misleading.13 On
this latter ground, the Commission, and the court of appeals on review, rejected as a defense the salesman's contention that he was justified in relying
on the fraudulent brochures prepared by his employer.14
In one sense, it may be said that the Berka decision is simply judicial
recognition of previously delineated Commission policy. This policy is
based on considerations affecting the application of the federal securities
acts-in particular the anti-fraud provisions-to the boiler-room sales operation. The federal securities laws are the result of congressional awareness
that securities are complex merchandise, and that intelligent investment
decisions require evaluation of detailed information concerning the security involved. 111 One of the primary efforts of the Commission to effectuate
these laws has been the imposition of a standard of professionalism upon the
securities business. 16 This standard frequently has been characterized by
the Commission as an implied representation of fair dealing between the
broker-dealer, or his salesman, and the customer.17 Consequently, the antifraud provisions have been construed to proscribe a variety of selling prac10 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b) and § 15A(b)(4), 49 Stat. 1378 (1936) and
52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1958) and 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(4)
(1958), provide for revocation of a broker or dealer's registration if any person employed
by a registered broker-dealer has willfully violated any provision of the securities acts,
and § 15A(b)(4) further provides for revocation if an employee previously has been
found a "cause" of a revocation. As interpreted by the Commission and the courts,
"cause" is a term of art and need not be an immediate or inducing cause. R. H. Johnson
&: Co., 33 S.E.C. 180, afj'd sub nom. R. H. Johnson &: Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 855 (1952).
11 Mac Robbins &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962.
12 Ibid. The Commission found not only that the sales literature was fraudulent,
but also that financial information contradicting the misrepresentations in the brochures
had been prepared and was readily available.
13 Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1963).
14 Ibid.
111 Mac Robbins &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962.
16 See generally Spedal Study pt. 1, at 237-40; Comment, 62 MICH. L. REv. 680, 734
(1964).
17 See, e.g., Charles Hughes &: Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 786 (1943); Duker&: Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939).
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tices other than misstatement of, or omission to state, a material fact.ls
Common-law concepts of fraud and deceit-requiring proof of false representation of a material fact, scienter, and frequently reliancelo_have
been greatly expanded by the Commission.20 Apparently, the aim is to prohibit as fraudulent conduct any activity which exploits or encourages inequalities of bargaining power or capability. The additional duty thus imposed is couched in terms of an implied standard of fair dealing, but can
be generically defined as a duty of disclosure incumbent on the seller whenever failure to disclose information is disadvantageous to a customer's informed and careful consideration of the investment factors applicable to
the security involved.
The so-called boiler room, because of the nature of the selling techniques involved, presents a formidable challenge to effective regulation of
securities sales practices. Typical boiler-room practices include the distribution of glamorous sales literature, usually describing an unlisted security, followed by high pressure long-distance telephone calls from the
salesman reiterating the glowing picture of growth and quick profits presented in the literature. The purpose is immediate sale, and factors which
tend to cast doubt on the predicted success of an investment are played
down, or often omitted entirely.21 The Commission itself has characterized
the boiler-room operation as "the antithesis of fair dealing." 22 Nevertheless,
such selling practices have not yet been held a per se violation of the antifraud provisions of the securities acts. 23 As a result, Commission efforts to
eradicate boiler-room practices necessarily have been directed to specific
conduct which does come within the scope of the anti-fraud provisions.
These attempts to curb sales abuses in the boiler-room context have taken
one of two forms. First, outright false statements are expressly proscribed
by the anti-fraud provisions24 and, when provable,25 are a sufficient basis
18 See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, supra note 17; Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795
(8th Cir. 1943). The anti-fraud provisions, supra note 5, are broader in coverage than
common-law definitions of fraud. Their composite effect, as applicable here, makes
unlawful use of the mails or interstate facilities in connection with the offer or sale
of any security where there is present a device to defraud, an untrue or misleading
statement of a material fact, omission to state such fact so as to be misleading, or
any act, practice, or course of conduct which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon a customer.
19 See Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 374 (1889).
20 For a comparison of securities fraud concepts and common-law deceit, see 3 Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1430-44 (2d ed. 1961).
21 See authorities cited in note 30 supra.
22 Mac Robbins & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962.
It has even been suggested that "firms which qualify for this ignominious appellation,
almost without exception, operate in violation of existing legal and ethical standards.''
Special Study pt. 1, at 265.
23 But cf. proposed Rule 15c2-6, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6885,
Aug. 16, 1962. This rule would make it unlawful for a broker or dealer to sell or
offer certain equity securities at a price of $10 or less by telephone unless he estab•
lishes that the transaction is exempt under the rule.
24 See note 18 supra.
25 Cf. text accompanying note 3 infra.
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for Commission action. As a second ground, the Commission has adopted
the position that representations made to a prospective customer without
an adequate basis are contrary to the basic obligation of fair dealing and
therefore also constitute fraud. 26 It is immaterial to such a determination
that representations are couched in terms of opinion, rather than fact, so
long as the representations are designed to induce purchases.27 As is suggested by the number of cases in which the Commission has employed the
"adequate basis" test as a standard for finding representations to be fraudulent, the test is not a new one.28 Berko v. SEC, however, was the first judicial
affirmation of this duty. The duty is based on the fair dealing standard
previously mentioned and presumably provides the salesman with a choice
of either having reasonable substantiation for oral representations made to
the customer or else refraining entirely from predictions concerning the
security. It appears that, if the salesman desires to make predictions, he
must investigate and compare all available information, and such information must provide an adequate basis for his prediction. On the other hand,
failure to investigate is not itself fraudulent conduct under this standard,
nor need the salesman disclose the basis for his representation to the customer. It is only in after-the-fact examination of such a representation that
the salesman must be able to show his statement concerning the security to
have been reasonable in light of all the information reasonably available
at the time of sale. Thus, at least ostensibly, investigation in the "adequate
basis" obligation of the salesman involves no affirmative duty of investigation.29
Neither of the two foregoing methods of control is sufficient protection
against the totality of abuse usually present in the boiler-room operation.
The essence of boiler-room technique is the presentation of a composite misrepresentation by means of a series of omissions and distortions, none of
which is itself clearly fraudulent. Consequently, it is often infeasible, because of the time and expense involved, to prove specific selling violations,
and fraudulent conduct may not be provable at all. Moreover, even in situations where there have been fraudulent oral representations, serious problems of proving that a specific salesman perpetrated a particular fraud arise
20 See, e.g., Alexander Reid & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6727,
Feb. 8, 1962; Barnett & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6310, July 5, 1960;
Best Sec. Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6282, June 3, 1960; Leonard
Burton Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5978, June 4, 1959.
27 See cases cited in note 26 supra.
28 Although the test has been frequently used, it is, nevertheless, a fairly recent
one, having been apparently first employed to determine the presence of fraudulent
conduct in 1959. Leonard Burton Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5978,
June 4, 1959.
20 The Commission logically could have expanded the duty to have an adequate
basis to include a responsibility for the accuracy of any literature the salesman distributes-requiring investigation before sale to avoid violation of the anti-fraud provisions if such literature is false-but it has not done so. The duty appears to be limited
to oral representations. Cases cited in note 26 supra.
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because the transaction has been conducted by long-distance telephone.so
This mode of selling also impairs initial discovery of violations because
there is no tangible evidence of infraction which the Commission might
find in a periodic inpection of a firm's records, and because many defrauded
customers, unaware that the representation is fraudulent, accept the loss
as a risk of speculation or, out of pride, hesitate to complain that they have
been duped. 31
It is in this area of misconduct difficult of proof that the Berko decision
is most significant. The court not only held that failure to have an adequate
basis for representations made to the customer is fraud, but also, independently, that the salesman has an affirmative duty to investigate information presented to the public to induce sales. As a result of his knowledge
that he was working in a boiler room, the salesman in Berko was put on
notice of the potentiality of unethical securities sales practices and therefore had constructive knowledge of the fraudulence of the contents of his
employer's sales brochures.32 Charged with this knowledge, the salesman's
continued participation in the boiler-room operation constituted willful
violation of the anti-fraud provisions, since he was responsible for allowing
customers to rely on the fraudulent brochures.33 The significance of this
holding is twofold. First, a finding of fraud based on failure to investigate
imposes a much higher standard than merely requiring restraint from representation if the available facts do not warrant a prediction. Reliance on
fraudulent information prepared by others will not exculpate the salesman;
an affirmative duty to investigate personally the accuracy of information
presented to the investing public is imposed. To avoid fraudulent conduct
it is no longer sufficient that the salesman simply refrain from making predictions himself; he must also investigate other information upon which the
customer may rely. Although the opinion in Berko v. SEC does not make
clear the extent of the investigation required, it suggests, as a minimum, the
examination of all available information concerning the security.34 Presumably, the obligation requires either a full disclosure of deficiencies or inaccuracies contained in the sales literature or else the salesman's immediate
dissociation of himself from the sales campaign.35 The public interest in
30 To prove fraud the Commission must not only ascertain what was communicated,
but also associate representations made by voice over the long-distance telephone to the
salesman and assemble some evidence concerning the issuer in order to make a showing
as to the false or misleading character of the representation. Loomis, Enforcement
Problems Under the Federal Securities Laws, 14 Bus. LA.w. 665, 673 (1959).
31 See Special Study pt. 1, at 304-08.
32 Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1963).
33 Ibid. The gravamen of the violation thus appears to be the failure of the salesman to disabuse the customer of the misleading information upon which the latter
might rely in deciding to purchase.
34 See note 12 supra.
35 Cf. Cady, Roberts &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, Nov. 8,
1961, where the Commission held that, if disclosure required of a corporate insider
would be improper or unrealistic under the circumstances, the alternative must be to
forego the transaction.
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such regulation surmounts objections that such a duty of investigation,
accompanied by commensurate disclosure, amounts to advising a customer
not to purchase,36 or that holding a boiler-room salesman responsible for
literature prepared by his employer is tantamount to guilt by association.87
As the Commission has suggested, there can be no justification for a claim
of reliance on literature furnished by an employer who is engaged in a
fraudulent sales campaign; 3B the effect of allowing exculpation of the salesman under these circumstances would be to place a premium on indiffer•
ence to responsibility at the point most directly and intimately affecting
the investor. Second, the holding in Berko established a duty which may
be breached even though a salesman claims reliance on misrepresentations
contained in printed matter. Misrepresentation is not an element of· the
salesman's fraud; therefore, evidence of fraudulent statements, made by the
salesman at some indeterminate time in the past over the long distance telephone, need not be produced.
However, as with most definitions of duty established by the Commission,39 the ad hoc nature of the finding of violation raises at least two important and related questions: (1) the extent of investigation required and:
(2) the situations in which the duty to investigate will be imposed. The
first question is one of degree. For example, in the Berko case the salesman
himself mailed out many of the fraudulent brochures and had ample opportunity to inspect them.40 Whether the salesman will also be held in
violation if his employer disseminates the fraudulent literature is left unanswered. Presumably, the salesman's conduct would be fraudulent in such
a situation if the material is reasonably available to the salesman.41 If so,
the question arises as to how much and what type of misrepresentation
must appear in the sales literature to make it fraudulent. 42 A policy of ad
hoc determination, made necessary by the differences in fact situations in
which selling malpractice may arise, considerably limits the specificity of
any answer which may be given to the question of degree of investigation
required. Some indication, however, is present in an answer to the second
problem-that of the situations in which the affirmative duty to investigate
will be imposed. The court in the Berko case predicated the duty of investigation and disclosure upon notice of the potentiality of fraudulent sales
36 Cf. Mac Robbins &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6462, at 7,
Feb. 6, 1961.
37 Cf. Brief for Petitioner, p. 12, Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963).
ss Mac Robbins &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962.
30 See generally Comment, 62 MICH. L. REv. 680 (1964).
40 See Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1963).
41 Cf. text accompanying note 56 infra.
42 The Commission found the brochures distributed by Berka fraudulent because
they emphasized that the company was a well-financed, expertly-managed, profit-making
enterprise when in fact the financing was questionable, the managers were inexperienced,
and the so-called dividends constituted merely a fractionating of shareholder's existing
equity interests. Mac Robbins &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846,
July 11, 1962.
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practices imputed to the salesman because of his knowledge that he was
involved in a high-pressure sales operation, a situation which, in the past
experience of the Commission, had proved a fertile ground for security
sales frauds. 43 The court thus specifically limited its decision regarding the
obligation of investigation to a boiler-room context44 and implied that the
principle of law applied was even further limited by the Commission findings of fact. 45 However, subsequent to this decision, the obligation of investigation has been applied in holding securities sales practices fraudulent
in at least three cases, only two of which involved boiler rooms and boilerroom salesmen.46
In the first of these, a civil action for damages,47 the facts were similar
to those of the Berko case, although the high-pressure long-distance telephone solicitation, following distribution of sales literature, was instigated
by the salesman. The salesman claimed reliance on oral information received from his employer as the basis for false predictions made to the
plaintiff customer.48 No fraudulent sales literature was involved, but, in
finding the salesman personally liable in damages for his customer's losses,
the court held the salesman to the same duty of investigation imposed in
Berko. 49 In a second case,50 a criminal proceeding, the court also cited the
Berko decision, and held that the salesman's conduct was criminally fraudulent since he should have been aware both that a boiler room was in progress and that the sales literature involved "was suspicious on its face to
anyone with the slightest financial knowledge." 51 It is significant in evaluating the scope of the holding in Berko v. SEC that in neither of the above
43 See Special Study pt. 1, at 265.
44 Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 142-43 (2d Cir. 1963).
45 Id. at 143 n.6. In administrative actions by the Commission such as that reviewed
in the Berka case, sanctions are preceded by findings of fact. Of the ten salesmen
implicated in the boiler-room operation which gave rise to the Berka decision, nine
were found to have engaged in fraudulent conduct. The tenth was found factually
not to have violated the anti-fraud provisions. Ibid. On the other hand, while injunctive actions by the Commission and criminal actions referred to the Attorney General
are preceded by an investigation performed by the Commission's staff, there is no
finding of fact by the Commission itself. Of course, such actions may result from facts
ascertained in a formal hearing. See generally 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 20, at 18941918, 1945-2004.
46 Cf. Richmond Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4584, Feb. 27, 1960, wherein
a duty of independent investigation of the issuer wa~ imposed on a broker-dealer acting
as the underwriter.
47 Herring v. Hendison, 218 F. Supp. 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
48 Id. at 420.
49 The court stated that "if a salesman working in a 'boiler room' house claims
that he relied on literature furnished by an employer who is engaged in a fraudulent
sales campaign, that reliance does not excuse him.'' Ibid. The evidence in this case
consisted almost entirely of the customer's testimony that the defendant was the salesman to whom he talked. Defendant denied this, but the court found that the testimony had the "ring of truth in it." Ibid.
50 United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 894 (1963).
51 Id. at 65. Defendant salesman's contention on appeal had been that there was
insufficient evidence of violation of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 because he was
warranted in relying on information given him by his employer. Ibid.
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cases was the decision preceded by a Commission finding of fact, since the
Commission is not a party to criminal proceedings or civil actions for damages under the securities acts. Both cases, however, dealt with the conduct
of a salesman working out of a boiler room.
The third case, SEC v. Chamberlain Associates,52 involved neither a
boiler room nor a salesman as such, but a financial public relations consultant hired to create a market for the stock.53 The court, ordering an injunction to issue against the defendant, relied on a conclusion of law that
his conduct was fraudulent in violation of section 17(a) of the Securities
Act. The evidence presented by the Commission in the action consisted,
inter alia, of a showing that the defendant had distributed a letter containing four false or misleading statements about certain mining stock.54
The letter was designed as a report to shareholders, and had been distributed as such by defendant's employer. However, defendant had utilized the
letter only to provide information for broker-dealers intended as a market
for the stock, and he had had no contact with the public. With respect to
the defendant's claim that his conduct was not fraudulent because he had
simply relied on the representations of others, the court stated that it was
by virtue of his representations that the stock would pass to the public, and
that defendant therefore "had the duty to investigate further." 55 In light of
this decision, it is obvious that the Commission does not intend to limit the
affirmative duty of investigation merely to the boiler-room context. A logical extension of the investigation requirement would be its application to
situations in which the circumstances of a sale should charge an employee
with knowledge that he is engaged in a fraudulent sales campaign, regardless of whether the operation is a boiler room or not. However, the Chamberlain case did not rest the finding of fraud upon any such knowledge
attributable to the defendant. Rather, his duty was independent of any
outside circumstances and arose because "the true facts were apparently
readily available by mere correspondence with ... others." 56 The result of
this decision is imposition of the duty of affirmative investigation upon all
persons in the securities business who are actively involved in sales efforts.
Availability of facts contradictory to representations concerning managerial
experience and financial status of the company the stock of which is to be
sold is, at best, a minimal requirement upon which to rest a duty, since
such information is usually in the public domain. And to suggest that the
information need only be "apparently" readily available is to diminish
further any limitation upon the duty of investigation. Moreover, it would
appear that, even if correct information is not "readily available" and the
52 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1J 91228 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1963).
53 Id. at 94070.
54 See note 45 supra. This evidence was apparently obtained through investigation
rather than from a finding by the Commission.
55 SEC v. Chamberlain Associates, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1J 91228, at 94070 (S.D.N.Y.
May 16, 1963).
66 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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information disseminated is false or misleading, distribution still constitutes a fraud, since investigation would disclose that there is no "adequate
basis" for the representations. 57
It cannot be doubted that the nature of the securities business requires
some standard of fair dealing and concomitant disclosure by the seller. The
broad scope of the anti-fraud provisions and the interpretation of them by
the Commission and the courts clearly indicate that some standard of professionalism is viewed as not only desirable, but mandatory. Within this
framework, adequate protection of the investing public may well require
the high duty imposed in the Berko case. However, the opinion leaves undefined not only the degree of investigation required (as well as more
limited considerations as to what constitutes an "adequate basis"), but also
the scope of the obligation in terms of when it is to arise. Some of the objection to the resulting uncertainty is obviated when the action is initially
a proceeding before the Commission, since the Commission must find, even
though the conduct is fraudulent, that the sanction to be imposed is in the
"public interest.''58 This requirement circumscribes to some degree the
harshness of ad hoc application of an undefined standard of conduct to securities sales practices. Further protection against arbitrary application of
the standard is provided by the nature of Commission proceedings-findings
viewed against the broad background of the entire securities industry, with
which the Commission is necessarily familiar. On the other hand, no such
limitations upon liability exist when the proceeding is a criminal or civil
action. 59 Failure to investigate the accuracy of information disseminated
to the public is a considerably broader concept of fraud than even previous
Commission interpretations of the anti-fraud provisions. It is not subject to
the prima fade elements of proof required in a common-law deceit action
or a proceeding for criminal fr~ud. If a breach of the duty of investigation
is to give rise to civil liabilities and criminal culpability, as well as Commission sanctions, there should be definitional limitations circumscribing
the raising of this duty. While the Berko case suggests imputed knowledge
of the employer's fraudulent conduct as a limited circumstance giving rise
to the duty, the Chamberlain holding indicates that the requirement is to
encompass far more than imputed knowledge. If the obligation is to arise
in all securities sales, it is definite and significant enough to be codified by
legislation or regulation. On the other hand, if reliance by the employee
upon information obtained from, or distributed by, his employer is frauduBut cf. note 29 supra and accompanying text.
Under the anti-fraud provisions, supra note 5, the Commission is directed to
impose a sanction only if it finds such action will be in the public interest. Since no
two cases present the same circumstances, it is difficult to generalize as to when the
public interest requires imposition of a sanction. However, the requirement does vest
in the Commission broad discretion which may be exercised against imposing sanctions
if the fraudulent conduct found is such that the violator was not aware of his duty.
See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 20, at 1323-26.
59 See cases cited notes 47, 50 supra and accompanying text.
57
58
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lent conduct in certain circumstances, the variety and subtlety of potential
abuses inherent in the sale of securities would make legislation or regulation impractical. It is thus incumbent upon the Commission to provide
more definitive guidelines as to when reliance by the salesman is no defense
and, conversely, when such reliance is reasonable. At present, the courts
and the Commission itself are not imposing upon the duty to investigate
the limitations suggested by the Berko case itself.

Willoughby C. Johnson

